ezBFT: Decentralizing Byzantine Fault-Tolerant State Machine Replication by Arun, Balaji et al.
EZBFT: Decentralizing Byzantine Fault-Tolerant
State Machine Replication
Balaji Arun
Virginia Tech
Blacksburg, VA, USA
balajia@vt.edu
Sebastiano Peluso
Amazon Web Services
Seattle, WA, USA
peluso.sebastiano@gmail.com
Binoy Ravindran
Virginia Tech
Blacksburg, VA, USA
binoy@vt.edu
Abstract—We present EZBFT, a novel leaderless, distributed
consensus protocol capable of tolerating byzantine faults.
EZBFT’s main goal is to minimize the client-side latency in WAN
deployments. It achieves this by (i) having no designated primary
replica, and instead, enabling every replica to order the requests
that it receives from clients; (ii) using only three communication
steps to order requests in the common case; and (iii) involving
clients actively in the consensus process. In addition, EZBFT
minimizes the potentially negative effect of a byzantine replica on
the overall system performance. We developed EZBFT’s formal
specification in TLA+, show that it provides the classic properties
of BFT protocols including consistency, stability, and liveness,
and developed an implementation. Our experimental evaluation
reveals that EZBFT improves client-side latency by as much
as 40% over state-of-the-art byzantine fault-tolerant protocols
including PBFT, FaB, and Zyzzyva.
Index Terms—Fault Tolerance, Consensus, Byzantine Faults
I. INTRODUCTION
State Machine Replication (SMR) is a common technique
employed in today’s distributed applications to tolerate server
failures and maintain high availability [1], [2]. The replication
servers, or replicas, employ consensus protocols (e.g., Raft [3],
Paxos [4], Zab [5]) to replicate the application state and ensure
that the same sequence of client commands is executed on the
shared state in the same order (i.e., a total order), ensuring
consistency of the replicated state.
Consensus solutions can be broadly classified as Crash
Fault-Tolerant (CFT) and Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (BFT),
with the former being a subset of the latter. While CFT
protocols have found their niche in datacenter applications [6],
[7], [8] of a single enterprise-class organization, BFT proto-
cols are increasingly used in applications involving multiple
independent organizations. For example, for distributed ledger
or blockchain-based applications in the permissioned setting,
consensus need to be reached among a set of known partic-
ipants (e.g., independent organizations), despite no complete
trust among them. In such cases, BFT protocols can ensure
replica state consistency while withstanding malicious actors
and other non-crash related faults. An example of a permis-
sioned blockchain system that uses a BFT protocol is the
Hyperledger Fabric [9], [10].
PBFT [11] is, arguably, the first practical implementation of
BFT consensus. Since its advent, a number of BFT protocols
have been invented. Some reduce client-side latency [12],
[13], [14], [15]; some optimize for higher server-side through-
put [16], [1]; some have greater tolerance to faults [17]; and
some reduce the design and simplementation complexity [18].
The use of permissioned blockchain applications is growing
in many domains (e.g., supply chain [19], real-estate [20],
finance [21]) and many such systems are increasingly deployed
in geographically distributed settings to cater to different appli-
cation needs. Geographical-scale (or “geo-scale”) deployments
of BFT systems have an additional challenge: achieving low
client-side latencies and high server-side throughput under
the high communication latencies of a WAN. Since replicas
need to communicate with each other and the clients to
reach consensus, the number of communication steps incurred
directly impacts the latency, as each step involves sending
messages to potentially distant nodes. Thus, protocols such as
Zyzzyva [14], Q/U [13], and HQ [15] use various techniques
to reduce communication steps. These techniques, however, do
not reduce client-side latencies in a geo-scale setting, where,
the latency per communication step is as important as the
number of communication steps. In other words, a protocol can
achieve significant cost savings if the latency incurred during
a communication step can be reduced.
The downside of such lack of locality is most manifest for
primary-based BFT protocols such as PBFT and Zyzzyva:
a replica is bestowed the primary status and is responsible
for proposing the total-order for all client requests. While
the clients that are geographically nearest to the primary
may observe optimal client-side latency, the same is not true
for distant clients. A distant client will incur higher latency
for the first communication step (of sending the request to
the primary). Additionally, the primary-based design limits
throughput as the primary carries significantly higher load.
To validate these hypotheses, we deployed Zyzzyva [14]
in a 4-replica geo-scale setting with nodes located in the US
(Virginia), Japan, India, and Australia, using Amazon’s EC2
infrastructure [22]. We deployed clients alongside each replica
to inject requests, and measured the client-side latencies by
changing the primary’s location. Table I shows the results. We
observe that the lowest latencies are when the primary is co-
located within the same region.
Past work suggests that it is important to perform regular
view changes (i.e., elect a new primary) to reduce the negative
impacts of a byzantine replica [23]. This makes it difficult to
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TABLE I: Zyzzyva’s [14] latencies (in ms) in a geo-scale
deployment with primary at different locations. Columns indi-
cate the primary’s location. Rows indicate average client-side
latency for commands issued from that region. For example,
the entry at the 4th row and the 3rd column shows the client-
side latency for commands issued from India to the primary
in Japan. Lowest latency per primary location is highlighted.
Virginia (US) Japan India Australia
Virginia (US) 198 238 306 303
Japan 236 167 239 246
India 304 242 229 305
Australia 303 232 304 229
set latency SLAs for geo-scale applications.
A leaderless protocol can solve the aforementioned prob-
lems. A client can send its requests to the nearest replica and
can continue to do so as long as the replica is correct. The
replica can undertake the task of finding an order among all the
concurrent requests in the system, executing the request on the
shared state, and return the result. Leaderless protocols [24],
[25], [26] have been previously proposed for the CFT model.
However, to the best of our knowledge, such investigations
have not been made for the BFT model.
The transition from CFT to BFT is not straightforward and
will yield a sub-optimal solution. As shown in [27], additional
communication steps as well as more number of messages
within each step are fundamental for such transformations.
This will result in sub-optimal server-side throughput since
more messages should be certified by replicas, (exponentially)
increasing the degree of computation. Moreover, additional
communication steps will increase client-side latency.
Motivated by these concerns, we present EZBFT, a leader-
less BFT protocol. EZBFT enables every replica in the system
to process the requests received from the clients. Doing so (i)
significantly reduces the client-side latency, (ii) distributes the
load across replicas, and (iii) tolerates faults more effectively.
Importantly, EZBFT delivers requests in three communication
steps in normal operating conditions.
To enable leaderless operation, EZBFT exploits a particular
characteristic of client commands: interference. In the absence
of concurrent interfering commands, EZBFT’s clients receive
a reply in an optimal three communication steps. When
commands interfere, both clients and replicas coherently com-
municate to establish a consistent total-order, consuming an
additional zero or two communication steps. EZBFT employs
additional techniques such as client-side validation of replica
messages and speculative execution to reduce communication
steps in the common case, unlike CFT solutions [24], [25].
We developed EZBFT’s formal specification in TLA+
(available in an accompanying technical report [28]) and
show that it provides the classic properties of BFT protocols
including consistency, stability, and liveness.
To understand how EZBFT fares against state-of-the-art
BFT protocols, we implemented EZBFT and conducted an
experimental evaluation using the AWS EC2 infrastructure,
deploying the implementations in different sets of geographical
regions. Our evaluation reveals that EZBFT improves client-
side latency by as much as 40% over PBFT, FaB, and Zyzzyva.
The paper’s central contribution is the EZBFT protocol. To
the best of our knowledge, EZBFT is the first BFT protocol
to provide decentralized, deterministic consensus in the even-
tually synchronous model. By minimizing the latency at each
communication step, EZBFT provides a highly effective BFT
solution for geo-scale deployments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents EZBFT’s assumptions. Section III overviews EZBFT,
and Section IV presents a complete algorithmic design and
correctness arguments. An experimental evaluation of EZBFT
is presented in Section V. We summarize past and related work
in Section VI and conclude in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a set of nodes (replicas and clients), in an asyn-
chronous system, that communicate via message passing. The
replica nodes have identifiers in the set {R0, ..., RN−1}. We
assume the byzantine fault model in which nodes can behave
arbitrarily. We also assume a strong adversary model in which
faulty nodes can coordinate to take down the entire system.
Every node, however, is capable of producing cryptographic
signatures [29] that faulty nodes cannot break. A message
m signed using Ri’s private key is denoted as 〈m〉Ri . The
network is fully connected and quasi-reliable: if nodes R1 and
R2 are correct, then p2 receives a message from R1 exactly
as many times R1 sends it.
To preserve safety and liveness, EZBFT requires at least
N = 3f + 1 replica nodes in order to tolerate f Byzantine
faults. EZBFT uses two kinds of quorums: a fast quorum with
3f+1 replicas, and a slow quorum with 2f+1 replicas. Safety
is guaranteed as long as only up to f replicas fail. Liveness
is guaranteed during periods of synchronous communication.
III. PROTOCOL OVERVIEW
We now overview EZBFT and highlight the novelties that
enable it to tolerate byzantine failures and provide optimal
wide-area latency.
EZBFT can deliver decisions in three communication steps
from the client’s point-of-view, if there is no contention, no
byzantine failures, and synchronous communication between
replicas. The three communication steps include: (i) a client
sending a request to any one of the replicas (closest prefer-
ably); (ii) a replica forwarding the request to other replicas
with a proposed order; and (iii) other replicas (speculatively)
executing the request as per the proposed order and replying
back to the client. These three steps constitute EZBFT’s core
novelty. To realize these steps, EZBFT incorporates a set of
techniques that we summarize below and explain in detail in
the next section.
First, the EZBFT replicas perform speculative execution
of the commands after receiving the proposal messages from
their respective command-leaders (see below). With only one
replica-to-replica communication, there is no way to guarantee
the final commit order for client commands. Thus, the replica
receiving the proposal assumes that other replicas received the
same proposal (i.e., the command-leader is not byzantine) and
that they have agreed to the proposal. With this assumption,
replicas speculatively execute the commands on their local
state and return a reply back to the client.
Second, in EZBFT, the client is actively involved in the
consensus process. It is responsible for collecting messages
from the replicas and ensuring that they have committed to
a single order before delivering the reply. The client also
enforces a final order, if the replicas are found to deviate.
Third, and most importantly, there are no designated pri-
mary replicas. Every replica can receive client requests and
propose an order for them. To clearly distinguish the replica
proposing an order for a command from other replicas, we use
the term command-leader. A command-leader is a replica that
proposes an order for the commands received from its clients.
For clarity, all replica can be command-leaders. To ensure that
client commands are consistently executed across all correct
replicas, EZBFT exploits the following concepts.
EZBFT uses the concept of command interference to em-
power replicas to make independent commit decisions. If repli-
cas concurrently propose commands that do not interfere, they
can be committed and executed independently, in parallel, in
any order, and without the knowledge of other non-interfering
commands. However, when concurrent commands do interfere,
replicas must settle on a common sequential execution.
Command Interference: A command encapsulates an opera-
tion that must be executed on the shared state. We say that two
commands L0 and L1 are interfering if the execution of these
commands in different orders on a given state will result in two
final states. That is, if there exists a sequence of commands
Σ such that the serial execution of Σ, L0, L1 is not equivalent
to Σ, L1, L0, then L0 and L1 are interfering.
Instance Space: An instance space can be visualized as
a sequence of numbered slots to which client-commands
can be associated with. The sequence defines the execution
order of requests, and the role of a consensus protocol is to
reach agreement among a set of replicas on a common order.
However, to accommodate our requirement that every replica
can be a command-leader for their received requests, each
replica has its own instance space. Thus, EZBFT’s role is not
only to reach consensus on the mapping of client-commands
to the slots within an instance space, but also among the slots
in different instance spaces.
Instance Number: An instance number, denoted I , is a tuple
of the instance space (or replica) identifier and a slot identifier.
Instance Owners: An owner number, O, is a monotonically
increasing number that is used to identify the owner of an
instance space. Thus, there are as many owner numbers as
there are instance spaces (or replicas). This number becomes
useful when a replica is faulty, and its commands must be
recovered by other replicas. When replicas fail, another correct
replica steps up to take ownership of the faulty replica’s
instance space. The owner of a replica R0’s instance space
can be identified from its owner number using the formula
OR0 mod N , where N is the number of replicas. Initially,
the owner number of each instance space is set to the owner
replica’s identifier (e.g., OR0 = 0, OR1 = 1, and so on).
Dependencies: Due to the use of per-replica instance
spaces, the protocol must agree on the relationship between
the slots of different instances spaces. EZBFT does this via
dependency collection, which uses the command interference
relation. The dependency set D for command L is every other
command L′ that interferes with L.
Sequence Number (S): is a globally shared number that is
used to break cycles in dependencies. It starts from one and is
always set to be larger than all the sequence numbers of the
interfering commands. Due to concurrency, it is possible that
interfering commands originating from different command-
leaders are assigned the same sequence number. In such cases,
the replica identifiers are used to break ties.
Protocol Properties: EZBFT has the following properties:
1) Nontriviality. Any request committed and executed by a
replica must have been proposed by a client.
2) Stability. For any replica, the set of committed requests at
any time is a subset of the committed requests at any later
time. If at time t1, a replica Ri has a request L committed
at some instance IL, then Ri will have L committed in
IL at any later time t2 > t1.
3) Consistency. Two replicas can never have different re-
quests committed for the same instance.
4) Liveness. Requests will eventually be committed by
every non-faulty replica, as long as at least 2f+1 replicas
are correct.
IV. PROTOCOL DESIGN
In this section, we present EZBFT in detail, along with
an informal proof of its properties. We have also developed a
TLA+ specification of EZBFT and model-checked the protocol
correctness; this can be found in the technical report [28].
A client command may either take a fast path or a slow
path. The fast path consists of three communication steps, and
is taken under no contention, no byzantine failures, and during
synchronous communication periods. The slow path is taken
otherwise to guarantee the final commit order for commands,
and incurs two additional steps.
A. The Fast Path Protocol
The fast path consists of three communication steps in the
critical path and one communication step in the non-critical
path of the protocol. Only the communication steps in the
critical path contribute to the client-side latency. The fast path
works as follows.
1. Client sends a request to a replica.
The client c requests a command L to be executed on the
replicated state by sending a message 〈REQUEST, L, t, c〉σc
to a EZBFT replica. The closest replica may be chosen to
achieve the optimal latency. The client includes a timestamp
t to ensure exactly-once execution.
2. Replica receives a request, assigns an instance number,
collects dependencies and assigns a sequence number, and
forwards the request to other replicas.
When a replica Ri receives the message m = 〈REQUEST, L,
t, c〉σc , it becomes the command-leader for L. It assigns c
to the lowest available instance number IL in its instance
space and collects a dependency set D using the command
interference relation that was previously described. A sequence
number S assigned for c is calculated as the maximum
of sequence numbers of all commands in the dependency
set. This information is relayed to all other replicas in a
message 〈〈SPECORDER, ORi, IL,D,S, h, d〉σRi ,m〉, where
d = H(m), h is the digest of Ri’s instance space, and ORi is
its owner number.
Nitpick. Before taking the above actions, Ri ensures that
the timestamp t > tc, where tc is the highest time-stamped
request seen by Ri thus far. If not, the message is dropped.
3. Other replicas receive the SPECORDER message, specu-
latively executes the command according to its local snap-
shot of dependencies and sequence number, and replies
back to the client with the result and an updated set of
dependencies and sequence number, as necessary.
When replica Rj receives a message 〈〈SPECORDER, ORi,
IL,D,S, h, d〉σRi ,m〉 from replica Ri, it ensures that m is
a valid REQUEST message and that IL = maxIRi + 1,
where maxIRi is the largest occupied slot number in Ri’s
instance space. Upon successful validation, Rj updates the
dependencies and sequence number according to its log, spec-
ulatively executes the command, and replies back to the client.
A reply to the client consists of a message 〈〈SPECREPLY,
ORi, IL,D′,S ′, d, c, t〉σRi , Rj , rep, SO〉, where rep is the re-
sult, and SO = 〈SPECORDER, ORi, IL, D,S, h, d〉σRi .
4. The client receives the speculative replies and depen-
dency metadata.
The client receives messages
〈〈SPECREPLY, O, IL,D′,S ′, d, c, t〉σRk , Rk, rep, SO〉, where
Rk is the sending replica. The messages from different
replicas are said to match if they have identical O, IL, D′,
S ′, c, t, and rep fields. The number of matched responses
decides the fast path or slow path decision for command L.
4.1 The client receives 3f + 1 matching responses.
The receipt of 3f + 1 matching responses from the replicas
constitutes a fast path decision for command L. This happens
in the absence of faults, network partitions, and contention.
The client returns reply rep to the application and then
asynchronously sends a message 〈COMMITFAST, c, IL, CC〉,
where CC is the commit certificate consisting of 3f + 1
matching SPECREPLY responses, and returns.
5. The replicas receive either a COMMITFAST or a COM-
MIT message.
Fig. 1: An example of a fast path execution.
5.1 The replicas receive a COMMITFAST message.
Upon receipt of a 〈COMMITFAST, c, IL, CC〉 message, the
replica Ri marks the state of L as committed in its local log
and enqueues the command for final execution. The replica
does not reply back to the client.
Example. Figure 1 shows an example case. The client
sends a signed REQUEST message to replica R0 to execute
a command L0 on the replicated service. Replica R0 assigns
the lowest available instance number in its instance space to
L0. Assuming that no instance number was used previously,
the instance number assigned to L0 is IL0 = 〈r0, 0〉. Then,
R0 collects dependencies and assigns a sequence number to
L0. As the first command, there exists no dependencies, so the
dependency set D = {}. Thus, the sequence number is S = 1.
A signed SPECORDER message is sent to other replicas in
the system with the command and compiled metadata. Other
replicas – R1 through R3 – receive this message, add the
command to their log, and start amassing dependencies from
their log that are not present in D. No other replica received
any other command, thus they produce an empty dependency
set as well, and the sequence number remains the same. Since
there are no dependencies, all replicas immediately execute the
command, speculatively, on their copy of the application state.
The result of execution, unchanged dependency set, sequence
number, and the digest of log are sent in a SPECREPLY
message to the client. The client checks for identical replies
and returns the result to the application. The replies are
identical in this case because no other command conflicts with
L0 in any of the replicas and the replicas are benign.
B. Execution Protocol
EZBFT uses speculative execution as a means to reply to
the client quickly. However, the protocol must ensure that
every correct replica has identical copies of the state. This
means that, when necessary (as described in Section IV-C),
the speculative state must be rolled back and the command
must be re-executed correctly; this is called final execution.
Moreover, differently from existing BFT solutions, EZBFT
collects command dependencies that form a directed graph
with potential cycles. The graph must be processed to remove
cycles and obtain the execution order for a command.
Each replica takes the following steps:
1) Waits for the command to be enqueued for execution.
For final execution, wait for the dependencies to be
committed and enqueued for final execution as well.
2) A dependency graph is constructed by including R and all
its dependencies in D as nodes and adding edges between
nodes indicating the dependencies. The procedure is
repeated recursively for each dependency.
3) Strongly connected components are identified and sorted
topologically.
4) Starting from the inverse topological order, every strongly
connected component is identified, and all the requests
within the component are sorted in the sequence number
order. The requests are then executed in the sequence
number order, breaking ties using replica identifiers.
During speculative execution, the execution is marked
speculative on the shared state. During final execution, the
speculative results are invalidated, command re-executed,
and marked final.
Note that speculative execution can happen in either the
speculative state or in the final version of the state, which
ever is the latest. However, for final execution, commands are
executed only on the previous final version.
C. The Slow Path Protocol
The slow path is triggered whenever a client receives
either unequal and/or insufficient SPECREPLY messages that
is necessary to guarantee a fast path. The client will receive
unequal replies if the replicas have different perspectives of
the command dependencies, possibly due to contention or due
to the presence of byzantine replicas. The case of insufficient
replies happen due to network partitions or byzantine replicas.
The steps to commit a command in the slow path are as
follows.
4.2 The client receives at least 2f + 1 possibly unequal
responses.
The client c sets a timer as soon as a REQUEST is
issued. When the timer expires, if c has received at least
2f + 1 〈〈SPECREPLY, ORi, IL,D,S, d, c, t〉σRi , Rj , rep, SO〉
messages, it produces the final dependency set and sequence
number for L. The dependency sets from a known set of 2f+1
replicas are combined to form D′. A new sequence number
S ′ is generated if the individual dependency sets were not
equal. c sends a 〈COMMIT, c, IL,D′,S ′, CC〉σc message to
all the replicas, where CC is the commit certificate containing
2f+1 SPECREPLY messages that are used to produce the final
dependency set.
Nitpick. Each command-leader specifies a known set of 2f+
1 replicas that will form the slow path quorum, which is used
by the client to combine dependencies when more than 2f+1
reply messages are received. This information is relayed to the
clients by the respective command-leaders and is cached at the
clients.
5.2 The replicas receive a COMMIT message.
Fig. 2: EZBFT: An example of a slow path execution.
Upon receipt of a 〈COMMIT, c, IL,D′,S ′, CC〉σc message,
replica r updates command L’s metadata with the received de-
pendency set D′ and sequence number S ′. The state produced
after the speculative execution of L is invalidated, and L is
enqueued for final execution. The result of final execution,
rep is sent back to the client in a 〈COMMITREPLY, L, rep〉
message.
6.2 The client receives 2f + 1 COMMITREPLY messages
and returns to the application.
The client returns rep to the application upon receipt of
2f + 1 〈COMMITREPLY, L, rep〉 messages. At this point,
execution of command L is guaranteed to be safe in the
system, while tolerating upto f byzantine failures. Moreover,
even after recovering from failures, all correct replicas will
always execute L at this same point in their history to produce
the same result.
Example: Figure 2 shows an example of a slow path. Two
clients c0 and c1 send signed REQUEST messages to replicas
R0 and R3, respectively, to execute commands L1 and L2,
respectively, on the replicated service. Assume that L1 and
L2 conflict. Replica R0 assigns the lowest available instance
number of 〈R0, 0〉 to L1. Thus, R0 collects a dependency set
DL1 = {} and assigns a sequence number SL1 = 1 to L1.
Meanwhile, R3 assigns the instance number 〈R3, 0〉 to L1;
the dependency set is DL2 = {}, and sequence number is
SL2 = 1. Replicas R0 and R3 send SPECORDER messages
with their respective commands and their metadata to other
replicas. Let’s assume that R0 and R1 receive L1 before L2,
while R2 and R3 receive L2 before L1. The dependency
set and sequence number will remain unchanged for L1 at
R0 and R1, because the dependency set in the SPECORDER
message received is the latest. However, the dependency set
and sequence number for L2 will update to D′L2 = {L1}
Fig. 3: An example of a slow path with a faulty replica.
and S ′L2 = 2, respectively. Similarly, the dependency set and
sequence number will remain unchanged for L2 at R0 and
R1, but for L1, D′L1 = {L2} and S ′L1 = 2, respectively.
The SPECREPLY messages for both L1 and L2 with the new
metadata are sent to the respective clients c0 and c1 by the
replicas.
Let’s assume that the slow quorum replicas are R0, R1,
and R2 for R0, and R1, R2, and R3 for R3. Since client c0
observes unequal responses, it combines the dependencies for
L1 from the slow quorum and selects the highest sequence
number to produce the final dependency set DL1 = {L2}
and sequence number SL1 = 2. This metadata is sent to the
replicas in a COMMIT message. Similarly, c1 produces the final
dependency set DL2 = {L1} and sequence number SL2 = 2
for L2, and sends a COMMIT message to the replicas. The
replicas update the dependency set and sequence number of the
commands upon receipt of the respective COMMIT messages,
and the commands are queued for execution. The replicas wait
for the receipt of the COMMIT messages of all commands in
the dependency set before processing them.
After the construction of the graph and the inverse topo-
logical sorting, there will exist commands L1 and L2 with a
cyclic dependency between them. Since the sequence numbers
for both the commands are the same and thus cannot break
the dependency, the replica IDs are used in this case. Thus,
L1 gets precedence over L2. L1 is executed first, followed by
L2. The result of the executions are sent back to the clients.
The clients collect 2f +1 reply messages and return the result
to the application.
Example with a faulty replica: Figure 3 shows an example
of the slow path that is very similar to that of Figure 2, but with
a faulty replica R2 that misbehaves. Notice that the REQUEST
and SPECORDER steps (first four rows) remain the same. Upon
receipt of the SPECORDER message from R0 and R3 for L1
and L2, respectively, the replicas collect the dependency set
and update the sequence number, and send back SPECREPLY
messages to the client. For L1, R0 and R1 send D′L1 = {}
and S ′L1 = 1; however, R2 misbehaves and sends D′L1 ={} and S ′L1 = 1, even though it received L2 before L1. For
L2, R2 and R3 send D′L2 = {} and S ′L2 = 1; R1 sendsD′L2 = {L1} and S ′L2 = 2. c0 receives a quorum of 2f + 1
SPECREPLY messages, and sends a COMMIT message with
an empty dependency set and a sequence number 1. On the
other hand, R1 that participated in command L1’s quorum
sends back a correct dependency set and sequence number.
Therefore, the final commit message for L2 will have L1 in
its dependency set. Thus, even though replicas immediately
execute L1 since L1’s final dependency set is empty, they
cannot do so for L2. Correct replicas must wait until L1 is
committed before constructing the graph, at which point L1
will be executed first because of the smallest sequence number,
followed by L2.
D. Triggering Owner Changes
EZBFT employs a mechanism at the clients to monitor the
replicas and take actions to restore the service when progress
is not being made. Although the slow path helps overcome
the effects of a participant byzantine replica, it does ensure
progress of a command when its command-leader, the replica
that proposed that command, is byzantine. From the client-
side, two events can be observed to identify misbehaving
command-leaders.
4.3 The client times-out waiting for reply from the repli-
cas.
After the client sends a request with command L, it
starts another timer, in addition to the one for slow-path,
waiting for responses. If the client receives zero or fewer
than 2f + 1 responses within the timeout, it sends the
〈REQUEST, L, t, c, Ri〉σc message to all the replicas, where
Ri is the original recipient of the message.
When replica Rj receives the message, it takes one of
the following two actions. If the request matches or has
a lower timestamp t than the currently cached timestamp
for c, then the cached response is returned to c. Otherwise,
the replica sends a 〈RESENDREQ,m,Rj〉 message where
m = 〈REQUEST, L, t, c, Ri〉σc to Ri and starts a timer. If the
timer expires before the receipt of a SPECORDER message,
Rj initiates an ownership change.
4.4 The client receives responses indicating inconsistent
ordering by the command-leader and sends a proof of
misbehavior to the replicas to initiate an ownership change
for the command-leader’s instance space.
Even though a client may receive prompt replies from
the replicas, it must check for inconsistencies leading to
a proof of misbehavior against the command-leader. The
〈〈SPECREPLY, ORi, IL,D′,S ′, d, c, t〉σRi , Rk, rep, SO〉 mes-
sages from different replicas are said to match if they have
identical ORi, I , D, S, c, t, and rep fields, but the contention
may affect the equality of the dependency set and sequence
number fields. Thus, the command-leader is said to misbehave
if it sends SPECORDER messages with different instance num-
bers to different replicas (i.e., if the I field varies between the
replicas). The client c can identify by inspecting SPECORDER
SO message embedded in the SPECREPLY message received
from the replicas. In this case, the client collects a pair of such
messages to construct a 〈POM, ORi, POM〉 message, where
POM is a pair of SPECREPLY messages, proving misbehavior
by the command-leader Ri of L.
E. The Owner Change Protocol
An ownership change is triggered for an instance space if
its original owner is faulty. However, to initiate an ownership
change, there must exist either a proof of misbehavior against
the owner, or enough replicas must have timed out waiting for
a reply from the owner.
A replica Rj commits to an ownership change by sending a
〈STARTOWNERCHANGE, Ri, ORi〉 message to other replicas,
where Ri is the suspected replica and ORi is its owner number.
When another replica Rk receives at least f+1 STARTOWN-
ERCHANGE messages for Ri, it commits to an ownership
change. From this point forward, Rk will not participate in
Ri’s instance space. The new owner number is calculated as
O′Ri = ORi + 1, and the new command-leader is identified
using O′Ri mod N (henceforth Rl). Replicas that have com-
mitted to an owner-change send 〈OWNERCHANGE〉 messages
to the new leader. Once the new command-leader Rl receives
f + 1 OWNERCHANGE messages, it becomes the new owner
of Ri’s instance space and finalizes its history.
Each replica sends an OWNERCHANGE message containing
its view of Ri’s instance space, i.e., the instances (speculative)
executed or committed since the last checkpoint, and the
commit-certificate with the highest owner number that it had
previously responded to with a commit message, if any. The
new owner collects a set P of OWNERCHANGE messages
and selects only the one that satisfies one of the following
conditions. For clarity, we label the sequence of instances in
each OWNERCHANGE message as Pi, Pj , and so on.
There exists a sequence Pi that is the longest and satisfies
one of the following conditions.
Condition 1 Pi has COMMIT messages with the highest
owner number to prove its entries.
Condition 2 Pi has at least f+1 SPECORDER messages with
the highest owner number to prove its entries.
If there exists a sequence Pj that extends a Pi satisfying
any of the above conditions, then Pj is a valid extension of
Pi if one of the following conditions hold:
1) Pi satisfies Condition 1, and for every command L in Pj
not in Pi, L has at least f + 1 SPECORDER messages
with the same highest order number as Pi.
2) Pi satisfies Condition 2, and for every command L in
Pj not in Pi, L has a signed COMMIT message with the
same highest order number as Pi.
The new owner sends a NEWOWNER message to all the
replicas. The message includes the new owner number O′R0,
the set P of OWNERCHANGE messages that the owner col-
lected as a proof, and the set of safe instances G produced
using Condition 1 and Condition 2. A replica accepts a
NEWOWNER message if it is valid, and applies the instances
from G in Ri’s instance space. If necessary, it rolls-back the
speculatively executed requests and re-executes them again.
At this point, Ri’s instance space is frozen. No new com-
mands are ordered in the instance space, because each replica
has its own instance space that it can use to propose its
command. The owner change is used to ensure the safety of
commands proposed by the faulty replicas.
F. Correctness
We formally specified EZBFT in TLA+ and model-checked
using the TLC model checker. The TLA+ specification is
provided in a technical report [28]. In this section, we provide
an intuition of how EZBFT achieves its properties.
Nontriviality. Since clients must sign the requests they
send, a malicious primary replica cannot modify them without
being suspected. Thus, replicas only execute requests proposed
by clients.
Consistency. To prove consistency, we need to show that if
a replica Rj commits L at instance I , then for any replica Rk
that commits L′ at I , L and L′ must be the same command.
To prove this, consider the following. If Rj commits L at
I = 〈Ri,−〉, then an order change should have been executed
for replica Ri’s instance space. If Rj is correct, then it would
have determined that L was executed at I using the commit
certificate in the form of SPECORDER or COMMIT messages
embedded within the CHANGEOWNER messages. Thus, L and
L′ must be the same. If Rj is malicious, then the correct
replicas will detect it using the invalid progress-certificate
received. This will cause an ownership change.
In addition, we need to also show that conflicting requests L
and L′ are committed and executed in the same order across all
correct replicas. Assume that L commits with D and S, while
L′ commits with D′ and S ′. If L and L′ conflict, then at least
one correct replica must have responded to each other in the
dependency set among a quorum of 2f + 1 replies received
by the client. Thus, L will be in L′’s dependency set and/or
viceversa. The execution algorithm is deterministic, and it uses
the sequence number to break ties. Thus, conflicting requests
will be executed in the same order across all correct replicas.
Stability. Since only f replicas can be byzantine, there must
exist at least 2f + 1 replicas with the correct history. During
an ownership change, 2f+1 replicas should send their history
to the new owner which then validates it. Thus, if a request is
committed at some instance, it will be extracted from history
after any subsequent owner changes and committed at same
instance at all correct replicas.
Liveness. Liveness is guaranteed as long as fewer than f
replicas crash. Each primary replica attempts to take the fast
path with a quorum of 3f + 1 replicas. When faults occur
and a quorum of 3f + 1 replicas is not possible, the client
pursues the slow path with 2f + 1 replicas and terminates in
two additional communication steps.
V. EVALUATION
We implemented EZBFT, and its state-of-the-art competi-
tors PBFT, FaB, and Zyzzyva in Go, version 1.10. In order
to evaluate all systems in a common framework, we used
gRPC [30] for communication and protobuf [31] for mes-
sage serialization. We used the HMAC [32] and ECDSA [29]
algorithms in Go’s crypto package to authenticate the mes-
sages exchanged by the clients and the replicas. The systems
were deployed in different Amazon Web Service (AWS)
regions using the EC2 infrastructure [22]. The VM instance
used was m4.2xlarge with 8 vCPUs and 32GB of memory,
running Ubuntu 16.04. We implemented a replicated key-value
store to evaluate the protocols. Note that, for Zyzzyva and
EZBFT, the client process implements the logic for the client
portion of the respective protocols.
Among the protocols evaluated, only EZBFT is affected by
contention. Contention, in the context of a replicated key-value
store, is defined as the percentage of requests that concurrently
access the same key. Prior work [24] has shown that, in
practice, contention is usually between 0% and 2%. Thus, a
2% contention means that roughly 2% of the requests issued
by clients target the same key, and the remaining requests
target clients’ own (non-overlapping) set of keys. However, we
evaluate EZBFT at higher contention levels for completeness.
A. Client-side Latency
To understand EZBFT’s effectiveness in achieving optimal
latency at each geographical region, we devised two experi-
ments to measure the average latency experienced by clients
located at each region for each of the protocols.
Experiment 1: We deployed the protocols with four replica
nodes in the AWS regions: US-East-1 (Virginia), India, Aus-
tralia, and Japan. At each node, we also co-located a client
that sends requests to the replicas. For single primary-based
protocols (PBFT, FaB, Zyzzyva), the primary was set to US-
East replica; thus, clients in other replicas send their requests
to the primary. For EZBFT, the client sends its requests to the
nearest replica (which is in the same region). The clients send
requests in closed-loop, meaning that a client will wait for a
reply to its previous request before sending another one.
Fig. 4: Average latencies for Experiment 1. All primaries are in
US-East-1 region. The latency is shown per region as recorded
by the clients in that region.
Figure 4 shows the average latency (in milliseconds) ob-
served by the clients located in their respective regions (shown
on x-axis) for each of the four protocols. For EZBFT, the
latency was measured at different contention levels: 0%,
2%, 50%, and 100%; the suffix in the legend indicates the
contention. Among primary-based protocols, PBFT suffers the
highest latency, because it takes five communication steps
to deliver a request. FaB performs better than PBFT with
four communication steps, but Zyzzyva performs the best
among primary-based protocols using only three communi-
cation steps. Overall, EZBFT performs as good as or better
than Zyzzyva, for up to 50% contention. In the US-East-1
region, both Zyzzyva and EZBFT have about the same latency
because they have the same number of communication steps
and their primaries are located in the same region. However,
for the remaining regions, Zyzzva clients must forward their
requests to US-East-1, while EZBFT clients simply send their
requests to their local replica, which orders them. At 100%
contention, five communication steps required for total-order
increases EZBFT’s latency close to that of PBFT’s.
Experiment 2: To better understand Zyzzyva’s best and
worst-case performances and how they fare against EZBFT,
we identified another set of AWS regions: US-East-2 (Ohio),
Ireland, Frankfurt, and India. This experiment was run similar
to that of Figure 4. The primary was placed in Ireland. The
results are shown in Figure 5. Figure 5a shows the average
latencies as observed by the clients in each deployed region
for each of the four protocols. The choice of Ireland as the
primary region represents the best case for Zyzzyva. Hence,
EZBFT performs very similar to Zyzzyva.
In Experiment 1, the regions mostly had non-overlapping
paths between them, and thus the first communication step of
sending the request to the leader can be seen clearly (notice
Mumbai in Figure 4. On the other hand, in Experiment 2,
connections between the regions have overlapping paths. For
example, sending a request from Ohio to Mumbai for EZBFT
will take about the same time as sending a request from Ohio
to Mumbai via the primary at Ireland for Zyzzyva.
Figure 5b shows the effect of moving the primary to
different regions. We disregard PBFT and FaB in this case,
as their performance do not improve. For Zyzzyva, moving
the primary to US-East-2 or India substantially increases its
overall latency. In such cases, EZBFT’s latency is up to 45%
lower than Zyzzyva’s. This data-point is particularly important
as it reveals how the primary’s placement affects the latency.
To curb the negative effects of byzantine primary replicas,
in [33], the authors propose to frequently move the primary
(this strategy is adopted by other protocols including Zyzzyva).
From Figure 5b, we can extrapolate that such frequent move-
ments can negatively impact latencies over time. Given these
challenges, we argue that EZBFT’s leaderless nature is a better
fit for geo-scale deployments.
B. Client Scalability
Another important aspect of EZBFT is its ability to maintain
low client-side latency even as the number of connected clients
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Fig. 5: Best case for Zyzzyva and the effect of moving primary
to different regions. Experiments reveal EZBFT’s effective-
ness. Legend entries show primary’s location in parenthesis.
increases. For this experiment, we deployed the protocols in
Virginia, Japan, Mumbai, and Australia, and measured client-
side latency per region by varying the number of connected
clients. Figure 6 shows the results. Notice that as Zyzzyva
approaches 100 connected clients per region, it suffers from
an exponential increase in latency. However, EZBFT, even at
50% contention, is able to scale better with the number of
clients. Particularly, in Mumbai, EZBFT maintains a stable
latency even at 100 clients per region, while Zyzzyva’s latency
shoots up.
Fig. 6: Latency per location while varying the number of
connected clients (1 – 100) per region.
C. Server-side Throughput
We also measured the peak throughput of the protocols.
For this experiment, we deployed the protocols in five AWS
regions: US-East-1 (Virginia), India, Australia, and Japan.
We co-located ten clients with the primary replica in US-
East-1. Unlike the experiments so far, here the clients send
requests in an open-loop, meaning that they continuously and
asynchronously send requests before receiving replies. The
requests consists of an 8-byte key and a 16-byte value.
Figure 7 shows the results. For EZBFT, we carried out two
experiments: i) clients are placed only at US-East-1 (labelled
EZBFT in the figure); and ii) clients are placed at every
region (labelled “EZBFT (All Regions)” in the figure). Due
to the leaderless characteristic, each of the replicas can feed
requests into the system, increasing the overall throughput.
The contention was set to 0%, and no batching was done.
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Fig. 7: Throughput of EZBFT and competitor BFT protocols.
Observe that when clients are placed only at US-East-1,
EZBFT performs at par or slightly better than others. On the
other hand, when clients are placed in all the other regions,
which does not yield any benefit for other protocols, EZBFT’s
throughput increases by as much as four times, as all EZBFT
replicas are able to process and deliver requests concurrently.
VI. RELATED WORK
BFT consensus was first introduced in [34]. However,
PBFT [11], [33] was the first protocol to provide a practical
implementation of BFT consensus in the context of state
machine replication. PBFT solved consensus in three commu-
nication steps (excluding two steps for client communication)
using 3f+1 nodes and requiring responses from at least 2f+1
nodes. f is the maximum number of byzantine faulty nodes
that the system can tolerate and make progress.
FaB [13] reduced the number of communication steps
required to reach agreement in the common case to two
steps, called two-step consensus (excluding two steps for client
communication). However, node and quorum requirements are
substantially larger with 5f+1 and 4f+1 nodes, respectively,
to tolerate f faults and still achieve two-step consensus. FaB
falls back to a slower path when 4f + 1 responses cannot
be acquired, and requires an extra communication step and at
least 3f + 1 nodes to reach agreement.
FaB was the first BFT protocol to not require any digital
signatures in the common case. Parameterized-FaB [13] re-
quires 3f + 2t+ 1 nodes, where f is the number of tolerated
faults and preserve safety and t is the number of tolerated
faults and solve two-step consensus. This minimized the node
requirements in the common case to 3f+1 (by setting t = 0),
but the quorum requirement is still more than that of PBFT.
The Q/U [12] protocol was the first to achieve consensus
in two communications steps when there are no faults and
update requests do not concurrently access the same object.
Q/U defines a simplified version of conflicts. Requests are
classified as either reads or writes. Reads do not conflict
with reads, while write conflicts with reads and writes. This
is more restrictive than the commutative property used by
EZBFT. In EZBFT, for instance, mutative operations (such
as incrementing a variable) are commutative.
HQ [15] is similar to PBFT with a special optimization
to execute read-only requests in two communication steps
and update requests in four communication steps under no
conflicts. HQ’s definition of conflict is the same as Q/U’s.
Zyzzyva [14], [35] uses 3f + 1 nodes to solve consensus
in three steps (including client communication), requiring a
quorum of 3f+1 responses. The protocol tolerates f faults, so
it takes an additional two steps when nodes are faulty. Zyzzyva
uses the minimum number of nodes, communication steps, and
one-to-one messages to achieve fast consensus. It is cheaper
than the aforementioned protocols, but also more complex.
Zyzzyva’s performance boost is due to speculative execution,
active participation of the clients in the agreement process,
and tolerating temporary inconsistencies among replicas.
EZBFT has the same node and quorum requirements as well
as the number of communication steps as Zyzzyva. However,
by minimizing the latency of the first communication step and
alleviating the specialized role of the primary, EZBFT reduces
the request processing latency.
Aliph [18] builds a BFT protocol by composing three differ-
ent sub-protocols, each handling a specific system factor such
as contention, slow links, and byzantine faults. Under zero
contention, the sub-protocol Quorum can deliver agreement in
two steps with 3f + 1 nodes by allowing clients to send the
requests directly to the nodes. However, as contention or link
latency increases, or as faults occur, Aliph switches to the sub-
protocol Chain whose additional steps is equal to the number
of nodes in the system, or to the sub-protocol Backup which
takes at least three steps. Although the idea of composing
simpler protocols is appealing in terms of reduced design
and implementation complexities, the performance penalty is
simply too high, especially in geo-scale settings.
In contrast, EZBFT exploits the trade-off between the slow
and fast path steps. EZBFT uses three steps compared to
Aliph’s two steps in the common case, and in return, provides
slow path in only two extra communication steps unlike Aliph.
Moreover, EZBFT’s leaderless approach reduces the latency of
the first communication step to near zero, yielding client-side
latency comparable to Aliph’s.
EBAWA [36] uses the spinning primary approach [23] to
minimize the client-side latency in geo-scale deployments.
However, a byzantine replica can delay its commands with-
out detection reducing the overall server-side throughput.
TABLE II: Comparison of existing BFT protocols and EZBFT.
Protocol PBFT Zyzzyva Aliph ezBFT
Resilience f < n/3 f < n/3 f < n/3 f < n/3
Best-case
comm. steps 5 3 2 3
Best-case
comm. steps
in absence of
...
Byz.
Slow links
Byz.
Slow links
Contention
Byz.
Slow links
Contention
Byz.
Slow links
Contention
Slow-path steps - 2 n + 3 2
Leader Single Single Single Leaderless
EZBFT’s dependency collection mechanism enables correct
replicas to only depend on commands that arrive in time, and
execute without waiting otherwise.
Table II summarizes the comparison of existing work with
EZBFT. Note that EZBFT and Zyzzyva have the same best-
case communication steps. However, for EZBFT, the latency
for the first-step communication is minuscule (tending towards
zero) when compared to Zyzzyva’s first-step latency.
Leaderless and multi-leader protocols [25], [26], [24],
[2] have been proposed for the CFT model. Among these,
EPaxos [24] and Caesar [25] collect dependencies and find a
total order among all the dependent requests. Both protocols
work in two phases: a fast phase that is reached under no
contention and an additional slow phase that is required under
contention. In EPaxos, the collected dependencies form a
graph, which is linearized before executed.
Caesar can deliver fast phase consensus even under non-
trivial contention by having a replica wait until some condi-
tions are satisfied before replying to the primary. Such wait
conditions are harmful in BFT protocols, because a malicious
replica can use this as an opportunity to cease progress.
In M2Paxos [26], a replica can order a request if it owns
the object that the request accesses. Otherwise, it forwards the
request to the right owner or acquires ownership. Acquiring
ownership means becoming the primary for some subset of
objects, and in CFT-based protocols, any replica can propose
to be a owner of any subset of objects at any point in time.
However, in BFT-based protocols, electing a primary is a more
involved process requiring consent from other replicas. In
addition, view numbers are pre-assigned to replicas; therefore,
randomly choosing primaries is not a trivial process.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
State-of-the-art BFT protocols are not able to provide op-
timal request processing latencies in geo-scale deployments
– an increasingly ubiquitous scenario for many distributed
applications, particularly blockchain-based applications.
We presented EZBFT, a leaderless BFT protocol that
provides three-step consensus in the common case, while
essentially nullifying the latency of the first communication
step. EZBFT provides the classic properties of BFT protocols
including nontriviality, consistency, stability, and liveness. Our
experimental evaluation reveals that EZBFT reduces latency
by up to 40% compared to Zyzzyva.
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APPENDIX
A. TLA+ Specification
TLC Model Values: Client ← [model value] < symmetrical > {c0}
FakeReplica ← [model value] < symmetrical > {r0}
GoodReplica ← [model value] < symmetrical > {r1, r2, r3}Commands ← [model value] <
symmetrical > {cmd0}
FastQuorum(r)← {case r = r0→ {r0, r1, r2, r3}
2r = r1→ {r1, r2, r3, r0}
2r = r2→ {r1, r2, r3, r0}
2r = r3→ {r1, r2, r3, r0}}
SlowQuourum(r)← {case r = r0→ {r0, r1, r2}
2r = r1→ {r1, r2, r3}
2r = r2→ {r1, r2, r3}
2r = r3→ {r1, r2, r3}}
MaxOwners ← 1
NextOwner(r)← case r = r0→ r1
2r = r1→ r2
2r = r2→ r3
2r = r3→ r0
WeakQuorum(r)← {case r = r0→ {r0, r1}
2r = r1→ {r1, r2}
2r = r2→ {r1, r2}
2r = r3→ {r1, r3}}
module ezBFT
extends Integers, FiniteSets, TLC , Sequences
Max (S )
∆
= if S = {} then 0 else choose i ∈ S : ∀ j ∈ S : j ≤ i
PT
∆
= instance PT
Constant parameters: Commands: the set of all possible commands Clients: the set of all possible
commands GoodReplica: the set of all possible commands FakeReplicas: the set of all ezBFT
replicas
FastQuorums(r): the set of all fast quorums where r is a command leader
SlowQuorums(r): the set of all slow quorums where r is a command leader Commands: the
set of all possible commands
constants Commands, Clients, GoodReplicas, FakeReplicas, FastQuorums( ),
SlowQuorums( ), WeakQuorums( ), MaxOwners, NextOwner( )
Replicas
∆
= GoodReplicas ∪ FakeReplicas
assume IsFiniteSet(Replicas)
assume Cardinality(Replicas) = (3 ∗ Cardinality(FakeReplicas)) + 1
Quorum conditions: (simplified)
assume ∀ r ∈ Replicas :
∧ SlowQuorums(r) ⊆ subset Replicas
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∧ ∀SQ ∈ SlowQuorums(r) :
∧ r ∈ SQ
∧ Cardinality(SQ) = ((Cardinality(Replicas) ∗ 2) + 1)÷ 3
assume ∀ r ∈ Replicas :
∧ FastQuorums(r) ⊆ subset Replicas
∧ ∀FQ ∈ FastQuorums(r) :
∧ r ∈ FQ
∧ Cardinality(FQ) = Cardinality(Replicas)
Special none command
none
∆
= choose c : c /∈ Commands
The instance space
Instances
∆
= Replicas × (1 . . Cardinality(Commands))
The possible status of a command in the log of a replica.
Status
∆
= {“not-seen”, “spec-ordered”, “committed”}
All possible protocol messages:
SpecOrderMessage
∆
=
[type : {“spec-order”}, src : Replicas, dst : Replicas,
inst : Instances, owner : Replicas,
cmd : Commands ∪ {none}, deps : subset Instances, seq : Nat ]
SpecReplyMessage
∆
=
[type : {“spec-reply”}, src : Replicas, dst : Clients,
inst : Instances, owner : Replicas,
cmd : Commands ∪ {none}, deps : subset Instances, seq : Nat , committed : subset Instances]
CommitFastMessage
∆
=
[type : {“commit-fast”}, src : Clients, dst : Replicas,
proof : subset SpecReplyMessage,
inst : Instances, owner : Replicas,
cmd : Commands ∪ {none}, deps : subset Instances, seq : Nat ]
CommitSlowMessage
∆
=
[type : {“commit-slow”}, src : Clients, dst : Replicas,
proof : subset SpecReplyMessage,
inst : Instances, owner : Replicas,
cmd : Commands ∪ {none}, deps : subset Instances, seq : Nat ]
CommitReplyMessage
∆
=
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[type : {“commit-reply”}, src : Replicas, dst : Clients,
inst : Instances, owner : Replicas]
CommitMessage
∆
=
CommitFastMessage ∪ CommitSlowMessage
CmdLogEntry
∆
= [inst : Instances,
status : Status,
owner : Replicas,
cmd : Commands ∪ {none},
deps : subset Instances,
seq : Nat ,
proof : subset CommitMessage]
InitOwnerChgMessage
∆
=
[type : {“init-owner-change”}, src : Replicas, dst : Replicas,
owner : Replicas, new owner : Replicas]
OwnerChgMessage
∆
=
[type : {“owner-change”}, src : Replicas, dst : Replicas,
owner : Replicas, new owner : Replicas,
proof : subset CmdLogEntry ]
NewOwnerMessage
∆
=
[type : {“new-owner”}, src : Replicas, dst : Replicas,
owner : Replicas, new owner : Replicas,
proof : subset CmdLogEntry ]
Message
∆
=
SpecOrderMessage
∪ SpecReplyMessage
∪ CommitSlowMessage
∪ CommitFastMessage
∪ CommitReplyMessage
∪ InitOwnerChgMessage
∪ OwnerChgMessage
∪ NewOwnerMessage
Variables:
cmdLog = the commands log at each replica
proposed = command that have been proposed
executed = the log of executed commands at each replica
sentMsg = sent (but not yet received) messages
crtInst = the next instance available for a command leader
leaderOfInst = the set of instances each replica has started but not yet finalized
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committed = maps commands to set of commit attributs tuples
owners = largest ballot number used by any replica
variables cmdLog , proposed , executed , sentMsg , crtInst , leaderOfInst ,
committed , ownerLog , owners
TypeOK
∆
=
∧ cmdLog ∈ [Replicas → subset CmdLogEntry ]
∧ proposed ∈ subset Commands
∧ executed ∈ [Replicas → subset (Nat × Commands)]
∧ sentMsg ∈ subset Message
∧ crtInst ∈ [Replicas → Nat ]
∧ leaderOfInst ∈ [Replicas → subset Instances]
∧ committed ∈ [Instances → subset ((Commands ∪ {none})×
(subset Instances)×
Nat)]
∧ ownerLog ∈ [Replicas → Replicas]
∧ owners ∈ [Replicas → Nat ]
vars
∆
= 〈cmdLog , proposed , executed , sentMsg , crtInst , leaderOfInst ,
committed , ownerLog , owners〉
Initial state predicate
Init
∆
=
∧ sentMsg = {}
∧ cmdLog = [r ∈ Replicas 7→ {}]
∧ proposed = {}
∧ executed = [r ∈ Replicas 7→ {}]
∧ crtInst = [r ∈ Replicas 7→ 1]
∧ leaderOfInst = [r ∈ Replicas 7→ {}]
∧ committed = [i ∈ Instances 7→ {}]
∧ ownerLog = [r ∈ Replicas 7→ r ]
∧ owners = [r ∈ Replicas 7→ 0]
Actions
SpecOrder(cmd , client , cleader , Quorum, inst , oldMsg)
∆
=
let newDeps
∆
= {rec.inst : rec ∈ cmdLog [cleader ]}
newSeq
∆
= 1 + Max ({t .seq : t ∈ cmdLog [cleader ]})
oldRecs
∆
= {rec ∈ cmdLog [cleader ] : rec.inst = inst} Get any old records
instCom
∆
= {t .inst : t ∈ {tt ∈ cmdLog [cleader ] :
tt .status ∈ {“committed”, “executed”}}}in
∧ cmdLog ′ = [cmdLog except ! [cleader ] = (@ \ oldRecs) ∪
{[inst 7→ inst ,
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status 7→ “spec-ordered”,
owner 7→ cleader ,
cmd 7→ cmd ,
deps 7→ newDeps,
seq 7→ newSeq ,
proof 7→ {}]}]
∧ leaderOfInst ′ = [leaderOfInst except ! [cleader ] = @ ∪ {inst}]
∧ sentMsg ′ = ((sentMsg \ oldMsg) ∪
[type : {“spec-order”},
src : {cleader},
dst : Quorum \ {cleader},
inst : {inst},
owner : {cleader},
cmd : {cmd},
deps : {newDeps},
seq : {newSeq}])
∪
{[type 7→ “spec-reply”,
src 7→ cleader ,
dst 7→ client ,
inst 7→ inst ,
owner 7→ cleader ,
cmd 7→ cmd ,
deps 7→ newDeps,
seq 7→ newSeq ,
committed 7→ instCom]}
StartSpecOrder(C , client , cleader)
∆
=
let newInst
∆
= 〈cleader , crtInst [cleader ]〉
in ∧ proposed ′ = proposed ∪ {C}
∧ (∃Q ∈ FastQuorums(cleader) :
SpecOrder(C , client , cleader , Q , newInst , {}))
∧ crtInst ′ = [crtInst except ! [cleader ] = @ + 1]
∧ unchanged 〈executed , committed , ownerLog , owners〉
SpecReply(replica, client , behavior)
∆
=
∧ ∃msg ∈ sentMsg :
∧msg .type = “spec-order”
∧msg .dst = replica
∧ let oldRec ∆= {rec ∈ cmdLog [replica] : rec.inst = msg .inst}in
∧ let newDeps ∆= if behavior = “good” then
msg .deps ∪
({t .inst : t ∈ cmdLog [replica]} \ {msg .inst})
else {}
newSeq
∆
= if behavior = “good” then
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Max ({msg .seq ,
1 + Max ({t .seq : t ∈ cmdLog [replica]})})
else 1
instCom
∆
= {t .inst : t ∈ {tt ∈ cmdLog [replica] :
tt .status ∈ {“committed”, “executed”}}}in
∧ cmdLog ′ = [cmdLog except ! [replica] = (@ \ oldRec) ∪
{[inst 7→ msg .inst ,
status 7→ “spec-ordered”,
owner 7→ msg .owner ,
cmd 7→ msg .cmd ,
deps 7→ newDeps,
seq 7→ newSeq ,
proof 7→ {}]}]
∧ sentMsg ′ = (sentMsg \ {msg}) ∪
{[type 7→ “spec-reply”,
src 7→ replica,
dst 7→ client ,
inst 7→ msg .inst ,
owner 7→ msg .owner ,
cmd 7→ msg .cmd ,
deps 7→ newDeps,
seq 7→ newSeq ,
committed 7→ instCom]}
∧ unchanged 〈proposed , crtInst , executed , leaderOfInst ,
committed , ownerLog , owners〉
FastPath(client , cleader , i , Q)
∆
=
∧ i ∈ leaderOfInst [cleader ]
∧Q ∈ FastQuorums(cleader)
∧ let replies ∆= {msg ∈ sentMsg :
∧msg .type = “spec-reply”
∧msg .inst = i
∧msg .dst = client
∧msg .src ∈ Q
∧msg .owner = cleader}in
∧ (∀ replica ∈ Q :
∃msg ∈ replies : msg .src = replica)
∧ (∀ r1, r2 ∈ replies :
∧ r1.deps = r2.deps
∧ r1.seq = r2.seq)
∧ let rep ∆= choose rep ∈ replies : truein
∧ ∃SQ ∈ SlowQuorums(cleader) :
(sentMsg ′ = (sentMsg \ replies) ∪
[type : {“commit-fast”},
src : {client},
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dst : SQ ,
inst : {i},
owner : {rep.owner},
cmd : {rep.cmd},
deps : {rep.deps},
seq : {rep.seq},
proof : {replies}])
∧ committed ′ = [committed except ! [i ] = @ ∪
{〈rep.cmd , rep.deps, rep.seq〉}]
∧ unchanged 〈proposed , executed , crtInst , ownerLog , owners,
leaderOfInst〉
SlowPath(client , cleader , i , Q)
∆
=
∧ i ∈ leaderOfInst [cleader ]
∧Q ∈ SlowQuorums(cleader)
∧ let replies ∆= {msg ∈ sentMsg :
∧msg .type = “spec-reply”
∧msg .inst = i
∧msg .dst = cleader
∧msg .src ∈ Q
∧msg .owner = cleader}in
∧ (∀ replica ∈ (Q \ {cleader}) :
∃msg ∈ replies : msg .src = replica)
∧ let finalDeps ∆= union {msg .deps : msg ∈ replies}
finalSeq
∆
= Max ({msg .seq : msg ∈ replies})
rep
∆
= choose rep ∈ replies : truein
∧ ∃SQ ∈ SlowQuorums(cleader) :
(sentMsg ′ = (sentMsg \ replies) ∪
[type : {“commit-slow”},
src : {cleader},
dst : SQ ,
inst : {i},
owner : {cleader},
cmd : {rep.cmd},
deps : {finalDeps},
seq : {finalSeq},
proof : {replies}])
∧ unchanged 〈cmdLog , proposed , executed , crtInst , leaderOfInst ,
ownerLog , owners, committed〉
FastCommit(replica)
∆
=
∃msg ∈ sentMsg :
∧ msg .type = “commit-fast”
∧ msg .dst = replica
∧ let oldRec ∆= {rec ∈ cmdLog [replica] : rec.inst = msg .inst}in
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∧ cmdLog ′ = [cmdLog except ! [replica] = (@ \ oldRec) ∪
{[inst 7→ msg .inst ,
status 7→ “committed”,
owner 7→ msg .owner ,
cmd 7→ msg .cmd ,
deps 7→ msg .deps,
seq 7→ msg .seq ,
proof 7→ {msg}]}]
∧ sentMsg ′ = (sentMsg \ {msg})
∧ unchanged 〈proposed , crtInst , executed , leaderOfInst ,
committed , ownerLog , owners〉
SlowCommit(replica)
∆
=
∃msg ∈ sentMsg :
∧ msg .type = “commit-slow”
∧ msg .dst = replica
∧ let oldRec ∆= {rec ∈ cmdLog [replica] : rec.inst = msg .inst}in
∧ (∀ rec ∈ oldRec : (rec.ballot = msg .ballot ∨
rec.ballot [1] < msg .ballot [1]))
∧ cmdLog ′ = [cmdLog except ! [replica] = (@ \ oldRec) ∪
{[inst 7→ msg .inst ,
status 7→ “committed”,
owner 7→ msg .owner ,
cmd 7→ msg .cmd ,
deps 7→ msg .deps,
seq 7→ msg .seq ,
proof 7→ {msg}]}]
∧ sentMsg ′ = (sentMsg \ {msg}) ∪
{[type 7→ “commit-reply”,
src 7→ replica,
dst 7→ msg .src,
inst 7→ msg .inst ,
owner 7→ msg .owner ]}
∧ unchanged 〈proposed , crtInst , executed , leaderOfInst ,
committed , ownerLog , owners〉
CommitDone(client , cleader , i , Q)
∆
=
∧ i ∈ leaderOfInst [cleader ]
∧Q ∈ SlowQuorums(cleader)
∧ let replies ∆= {msg ∈ sentMsg :
∧msg .type = “commit-reply”
∧msg .inst = i
∧msg .dst = client
∧msg .src ∈ Q
∧msg .owner = cleader}in
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∧ (∀ replica ∈ Q : ∃msg ∈ replies :
msg .src = replica)
∧ leaderOfInst ′ = [leaderOfInst except ! [cleader ] = @ \ {i}]
∧ let rep ∆= choose rep ∈ replies : truein
committed ′ = [committed except ! [i ] = @ ∪
{〈rep.cmd , rep.deps, rep.seq〉}]
∧ unchanged 〈cmdLog , sentMsg , proposed , executed ,
crtInst , ownerLog , owners〉
Recovery actions
InitOwnerChange(replica, cleader , nowner , Q)
∆
=
∧ replica 6= cleader
∧Q ∈ WeakQuorums(nowner)
∧ owners[cleader ] < (MaxOwners ∗ Cardinality(Q))
∧ sentMsg ′ = sentMsg ∪
[type : {“init-owner-change”},
src : {replica},
dst : Q ,
owner : {cleader},
new owner : {nowner}]
∧ ownerLog ′ = [ownerLog except ! [cleader ] = nowner ]
∧ owners ′ = [owners except ! [cleader ] = @ + 1]
∧ unchanged 〈cmdLog , proposed , executed , crtInst ,
leaderOfInst , committed〉
OwnerChange(replica, nowner , Q)
∆
=
∧Q ∈ WeakQuorums(nowner)
∧ replica ∈ Q
∧ let msgs ∆= {msg ∈ sentMsg :
∧msg .type = “init-owner-change”
∧msg .dst = replica
∧msg .new owner = nowner}in
∧ Cardinality(msgs) ≥ Cardinality(Q)
∧ ∀ r1, r2 ∈ msgs :
∧ r1.owner = r2.owner
∧ r1.new owner = r2.new owner
∧ let msg ∆= choose msg ∈ msgs : truein
∧ (sentMsg ′ = (sentMsg \msgs) ∪
{[type 7→ “owner-change”,
src 7→ replica,
dst 7→ msg .new owner ,
owner 7→ msg .owner ,
new owner 7→ msg .new owner ,
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proof 7→ cmdLog [msg .owner ]]})
∧ unchanged 〈cmdLog , proposed , executed , crtInst , leaderOfInst ,
committed , ownerLog , owners〉
NewOwner(owner , WQ , SQ)
∆
=
∧WQ ∈ WeakQuorums(owner)
∧ SQ ∈ SlowQuorums(owner)
∧ let msgs ∆= {msg ∈ sentMsg :
∧msg .type = “owner-change”
∧msg .dst = owner
∧msg .new owner = owner
∧msg .src ∈ WQ}in
∧ PrintT (“NewOwner − begin”)
∧ PrintT (Cardinality(msgs))
∧ Cardinality(msgs) ≥ Cardinality(WQ)
∧ PrintT (Cardinality(msgs))
∧ (∀ r ∈ WQ :
∃msg ∈ msgs : msg .src = r)
∧ ∀ r1, r2 ∈ msgs :
∧ r1.owner = r2.owner
∧ r1.new owner = r2.new owner
∧ ∃ lmsg ∈ msgs :
∧ ∀msg2 ∈ msgs \ {lmsg} :
Cardinality(lmsg .proof ) ≥ Cardinality(msg2.proof )
∧ let cmsgs ∆= {p ∈ lmsg .proof : p.status = “committed”}
pmsgs
∆
= {p ∈ lmsg .proof : p.status = “spec-ordered”
∧ Cardinality(p.proof ) ≥ Cardinality(FakeReplicas) + 1}
in
∧ (sentMsg ′ = (sentMsg \msgs) ∪
[type : {“new-owner”},
src : {owner},
dst : SQ ,
owner : {lmsg .owner},
new owner : {lmsg .new owner},
proof : cmsgs ∪ pmsgs]) proof: cmsgs ∪ [pmsgs except ! .status = “committed”]])
∧ unchanged 〈cmdLog , proposed , executed , crtInst ,
leaderOfInst , committed , ownerLog , owners〉
CompleteOwnerChange(new , replica, SQ)
∆
=
∧ SQ ∈ SlowQuorums(new)
∧ replica ∈ SQ
∧ let pmsg ∆= {msg ∈ sentMsg :
∧msg .type = “new-owner”
∧msg .dst = replica
∧msg .src = new}in
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∧ Cardinality(pmsg) ≥ 1
∧ let msg ∆= choose msg ∈ pmsg : truein
∧ let oldRec ∆= {rec ∈ cmdLog [replica] :
∀ p ∈ msg .proof : rec.inst = p.inst}in
∧ cmdLog ′ = [cmdLog except ! [replica] = msg .proof ]
∧ ownerLog ′ = [ownerLog except ! [msg .owner ] = msg .new owner ]
∧ sentMsg ′ = sentMsg \ {pmsg}
∧ PrintT (“CompleteOwnerChange”)
∧ unchanged 〈cmdLog , proposed , executed , crtInst ,
leaderOfInst , committed , owners〉
Action groups
CommandLeaderAction
∆
=
∨ ∃ cleader ∈ Replicas :
∨ ∃ cmd ∈ (Commands \ proposed) : ∃ client ∈ Clients :
StartSpecOrder(cmd , client , cleader)
∨ ∃new ∈ Replicas : ∃SQ ∈ SlowQuorums(new) : ∃WQ ∈ WeakQuorums(new) :
NewOwner(new , WQ , SQ)
GoodReplicaAction
∆
=
∨ ∃ replica ∈ GoodReplicas :
∨ ∃ client ∈ Clients : SpecReply(replica, client , “good”)
∨ FastCommit(replica)
∨ SlowCommit(replica)
∨ ∃ replica ∈ Replicas : ∃ l ∈ Replicas :
let new
∆
= NextOwner(l)in
∨ ∧ l 6= new
∧ ∃WQ ∈ WeakQuorums(new) :
∨ InitOwnerChange(replica, l , new , WQ)
∨OwnerChange(replica, new , WQ)
∨ ∃SQ ∈ WeakQuorums(l) : CompleteOwnerChange(new , replica, SQ)
FakeReplicaAction
∆
=
∨GoodReplicaAction
∨ ∃ replica ∈ FakeReplicas :
∃ client ∈ Clients : SpecReply(replica, client , “bad”)
ClientAction
∆
=
∧ ∃ client ∈ Clients : ∃ replica ∈ Replicas : ∃ inst ∈ leaderOfInst [replica] :
∃ ballot ∈ 0 . . MaxOwners :
∨ (∃Q ∈ FastQuorums(replica) : FastPath(client , replica, inst , Q))
∨ (∃Q ∈ SlowQuorums(replica) :
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SlowPath(client , replica, inst , Q))
∨ (∃Q ∈ SlowQuorums(replica) :
CommitDone(client , replica, inst , Q))
∧ unchanged 〈cmdLog〉
Next action
Next
∆
=
∨ CommandLeaderAction
∨GoodReplicaAction
∨ FakeReplicaAction
∨ ClientAction
The complete definition of the algorithm
Spec
∆
= Init ∧2[Next ]vars
Theorems
Nontriviality
∆
=
∀ i ∈ Instances :
2(∀C ∈ committed [i ] : C [1] ∈ proposed ∨ C [1] = none)
Stability
∆
=
∀ replica ∈ Replicas :
∀ i ∈ Instances :
∀C ∈ Commands :
2((∃ rec1 ∈ cmdLog [replica] :
∧ rec1.inst = i
∧ rec1.cmd = C
∧ rec1.status ∈ {“committed”})⇒
2(∃ rec2 ∈ cmdLog [replica] :
∧ rec2.inst = i
∧ rec2.cmd = C
∧ rec2.status ∈ {“committed”}))
Consistency
∆
=
∀ i ∈ Instances :
2(Cardinality(committed [i ]) ≤ 1)
theorem Spec ⇒ (2TypeOK ) ∧Nontriviality ∧ Stability ∧ Consistency
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